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The goal of the Basle II regulatory formula is to model the unexpected loss on a loan 
portfolio. The regulatory formula is based on an asymptotic portfolio unexpected 
default rate estimation that is multiplied by an estimate of the loss given default 
parameter. This simplification leads to a surprising phenomenon when the resulting 
regulatory capital depends on the definition of default that plays the role of a 
frontier between the unexpected default rate estimate and the LGD parameter 
whose unexpected development is not modeled at all or only partially. We study the 
phenomenon in the context of single-factor models where default and loss given 
default are driven by one systemic factor and by one or more idiosyncratic factors. 
In this theoretical framework we propose and analyze a relatively simple remedy of 
the problem requiring that the LGD parameter be estimated as a quantile on the 
required probability level. 
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The Basle II regulatory formula (see Basle, 2006) aims to provide a sufficiently robust 
estimate of unexpected losses on banking credit exposures that should be covered by the 
capital. It is a compromise between the most advanced mathematical modeling techniques and 
the demand for a practical implementation. One of the most important simplifications is the 
decision to calculate unexpected losses (UL) using an estimate of the Unexpected Default 
Rate (UDR) multiplied through by the expected Loss Given Default parameter (LGD), i.e. 
UL=UDR￿LGD. The capital requirement (C) as a percentage out of the exposure is then set 
equal to the difference between the unexpected and expected loss (EL), C = UL-EL = (UDR-
PD)￿LGD, where PD is the expected default rate, i.e. the probability of default. 
While the expected default rate estimation based on the Vasicek (1987) approach is 
considered to be relatively robust, the resulting estimation of the unexpected loss has been 
criticized for neglecting the unexpected LGD (or equivalently recovery) risk. It has been 
empirically shown in a series of papers by Altman et al. (see e.g. 2004), Gupton et al. (2000), 
Frye (2000b, 2003), or Acharya et al. (2007) that there is not only a significant systemic 
variation of recovery rates but moreover a negative correlation between frequencies of default 
and recovery rates, or equivalently a positive correlation between frequencies of default and 
losses given default. Consequently the regulatory formula significantly underestimates the 
unexpected loss on the targeted confidence probability level (99.9%) and the time horizon 
(one year). Some authors have proposed alternative unexpected loss formulas incorporating 
the impact recovery risk variation. 
Frye (2000a, 2000b) has used a single systemic factor model with an idiosyncratic factor 
driving the event of default and another independent idiosyncratic factor driving the recovery   2 
rate. The loading of the systemic factor for modeling of default and recovery rates may differ. 
The recovery rate is modeled as a normal variable truncated at 100%. Frye does not provide 
an analytical formula but analyzes robustness of the loss estimates using Monte Carlo 
simulation for different combinations of the input parameters. The parameters are also 
estimated using the maximum likelihood method from the Moody’s Risk Service Default 
database. Alternatively Dullmann and Trapp (2004) apply the logit transformation for 
recovery modeling in the same set up as Frye. 
Pykhtin (2003) considers a single systemic factor model where default is driven by a 
systemic factor and an idiosyncratic factor while recovery is driven not only by the systemic 
factor and an independent idiosyncratic factor, but at the same time by another idiosyncratic 
factor driving the obligor’s default. The collateral (recovery) value is set to have a lognormal 
distribution. Pykhtin arrives to an analytic formula which requires numerical approximations 
of the bivariate normal cumulative distribution values. The author admits that calibration of 
the model is difficult. 
Tasche (2004) proposes a single factor approach modeling directly the loss function. If 
there is no default the value of the loss function is zero and if there is a default (the systemic 
factor exceeds the default threshold) the value of the loss is drawn from a distribution as a 
function the systemic factor. The obligor factor is decomposed as usual into the systemic and 
idiosyncratic factor. In other words the single obligor factor is used to model the event of 
default and the loss given default as well. Tasche proposes to model LGD by a beta 
distribution. Quantiles of the loss function conditional on the systemic factor values may be 
expressed as an integral over a tail of the normally distributed factor. Tasche proposes to 
approximate the integral using Gauss quadrature and tests the model for different PD, 
mean/variance LGD, and correlation values. The approach is also elaborated in Kim (2006). 
This study is motivated not only by the fact that the Basle II formula significantly 
underestimates the unexpected credit losses but also by the observation according to which 
the regulatory capital requirement depends on the definition of default which in a sense puts a 
border line between the PD and LGD parameters. This phenomenon has been analyzed in 
Witzany (2008) using a Merton model based simulation. To give a more tractable analytical 
explanation we will apply the Tasche and Frye single factor models as benchmarks against 
which we analyze the sensitivity of the regulatory formula. At the same time we propose a 
simple specification of the regulatory formula in order to eliminate the problem. We propose 
to preserve the formula UL=UDR￿LGD as well as the regulatory formula for unexpected 
default rate (UDR), but to reinterpret the parameter LGD as the 99.9% quantile of possible   3 
portfolio loss given default values. The Basle (2005) document goes in this direction requiring 
LGD estimates to incorporate potential economic downturn conditions and adverse 
dependencies between default rates and recovery rates but fails to specify the confidence 
probability level of those conservative estimations. We argue that any probability level below 
99.9% preserves the problem definition of default sensitivity (and underestimation of the 
99.9% loss function percentile) while the 99.9% LGD quantile solves the problem under 
reasonable modeling assumptions. We propose a single factor beta distribution based 
technique calibrated with account level LGD mean, variance, cure rate and a correlation to 
obtain robust estimates of the 99.9%  LGD quantiles. As the reinterpretation of the formula 
leads to significantly higher capital requirement we propose to reduce the probability level 
e.g. to a more a realistic 99.5% currently used by the Solvency II proposal. 
   
2. Sensitivity of the Regulatory Capital on the Definition of Default 
 
According to Basle II the contribution of a receivable to the unexpected loss of a well-


























The correlation r is set up by the regulator (e.g. 15% for mortgage loans, 4% for revolving 
loans, and somewhere between the two values depending on PD for other retail loans) while 
the parameters PD and LGD are estimated by the bank (in the IRBA approach). 
The usual LGD estimation approach is based on a sufficiently large historical data set of a 
homogenous portfolio of receivables  A in terms of product type, credit rating, and 
collateralization. The receivables have been observed for at least one year and we have a 
record  :[0,1] lA ﬁ  of percentage losses  () la on the exposure at default if default occurred or 
0 otherwise for every a A ˛ , and an indicator function  { : 0,1} dA ﬁ of default in the one year 
horizon. It seems natural to require that  ()1 da=  iff  ()0 la>  as in Tasche (2004), however in 
practice such a condition is difficult to achieve. According to Basle II receivables more than 
90 days overdue must be marked as defaulted. Some of the clients then naturally happen to 
pay all their obligations back; in particular in case of retail clients days overdue may just be a 
result of payment indiscipline not of a real lack of income to repay the loan. Hence we may   4 
require only that  ()0 la> implies  ()1 da= but not vice versa. The PD and LGD parameters of 
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Here we are using equally weighted average loss given default that could be applied to a 
portfolio homogenous in terms of size. Let  |(} { )0 H Al D a a ˛> =  be the set of receivables 
where we observed a positive loss, i.e. a hard default, and  H p ,  H lgd  the averages as above. 
While the average (or expected) account level percentage loss  ·· HH lgd l pd p lg = =  remains 
unchanged it is easy to see that  H pp <  and  H lgdlgd >  provided  H DD ￿ . As banks have 
certain freedom for setting up their own definition of default, the ratio  / H ppmay be in 
practice anywhere between 1 and 2. Banks may choose a lower days-past-due default 
threshold (e.g. 60 days), or lower materiality condition (minimum amount past due implying 
the default), or apply different cross-default rules (default on one product implying defaults 
on other products with the same obligor), etc. More accounts with ultimate loss zero are then 
marked as defaulted. On the other hand the definition of default must not be too soft: if an 
account is marked as defaulted the probability of real loss should be at least 50%. Hence 
given the same historical information (reference data set  A) with the account level average 
loss ELl =  and choosing different definition of default we obtain different values of 
( ) ,2· HH PD pp ˛ and   ( ) /, · 2 HH l LGDE dd LPD glg ˛ = . Since the definition of default does 
not change the distribution of losses implied by the reference data set the unexpected loss 
estimate given by (1) should remain essential the same. However Figure  shows that this is not 
the case. When we set  2% EL =  and let  (2.5%,5%) PD˛ then the  () ULULPD =  parameter 
goes from 16.3% down to 12.5%. In other words choosing the softest possible definition of 
default will reduce the capital requirement CULEL =- by almost 30% compared to the hard 
definition of default.  
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Figure 1. Unexpected loss according to the Basle II formula if EL=PD￿LGD=2% is fixed 
and PD varies from 2.5% to 5% ( 15% r = ).   
 
It could be argued that the problem is solved by the requirement (Basle, 2005) on LGD to 
reflect downturn economic conditions or PD/LGD correlation. However this requirement 
given sufficiently rich historical data set is normally implemented using only the data set 
AA ¢￿  from years with economic downturn conditions and/or high-observed frequency of 
default. The PD, LGD parameters estimated from A¢ and UL calculated according to (1) will 
again depend on the definition of default in the same way as above. 
 
3. Alternative Single Factor Models 
 
The single factor models of Frye (2000a, 2000b), Pykhtin (2003), Tasche (2004), and 
others can be generally described as follows. Let the (percentage) loss of a receivable in the 
given time horizon be an increasing function of one systemic factor  X and of a vector z
ur
 of 
idiosyncratic factors (,) LLXz =
r
. The factor  X  captures macroeconomic or other systemic 
influences that may develop in time while z
ur
reflects specificities of each individual obligor in 
a portfolio. Hence the impact of  z
ur
is diversified away in a large (asymptotic) portfolio while 
X  remains as a risk factor. Consequently the future unknown loss on a large portfolio can be 
modeled as [|] ELX (see Gordy, 2003 for details). Since we assume that Lis increasing in 
X the problem to find quantiles of [|] ELX reduces to calculation of quantiles of X . If  xis 
the desired (e.g. for 99.9%) quantile of X then  [|] ULELXx == . This is a clear advantage of 
the single-factor approach compared to the multi-factor approach where we work with a   6 
vector  X
uur
of systemic factors instead of one factor X  and the determination of quantiles of 
[|] ELX
uur
 becomes complex. 
The expression for the unexpected loss may be decomposed into two parts corresponding 
to the unexpected default rate and loss given default: 
[|][0| · |0, ] [] ELXxPLXx ELLXx ==>= >= . 
Here we use the hard definition of default  0 H DL ￿>  while as explained above in 
practice we usually need to work with a softer definition of default. We will say that 
(,) DDXz =
r
is a consistent notion of default provided  0 LD >￿ . Then the unexpected loss 
may be in general decomposed as 
(2)    · ] ,] [ | | [ ULPD x X L x EDX == = . 
The simplest version of the singled-factor model is probably the model proposed by the 
Tasche (2004). The loss function  (,) LLXz =  is driven by one standard-normally distributed 
factor 1 Y X rrz +- =  where  X  and z  are independent standard-normally distributed, 
and r  is their correlation.  If L is assumed to have a cumulative probability distribution 
function  :[0,1] [0,1] L F ﬁ  then we may express the loss function in the form 
* ( ( , 1 ) ) ( ) L LXF X rr z z F+- = or just 
*( ) ) () ( L LYF Y F =  where 
* inf{:} ()() L L tF Fzt z ‡ = is 
the generalized inverse of  L F . 
In a sense more natural model has been proposed by Frye (2000a,2000b) which may be in 
a generalized for described as follows. Let  1111 1 X Y rrz +- = and 
22 2 2 1 X Y rrz +- = be two standard-normally distributed factors with one systemic and 
two independent idiosyncratic factors. The correlations  1 r and  2 r may be in general different. 
The first factor  1 Y  drives defaults in the model while the second  2 Y is assumed to drive losses 
in case of default. I.e. there is a default threshold  D y and a nonnegative non-decreasing 
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If  G F is the distribution function of the random variable  1 () GY then the loss function may be 
expressed as 
*
22 ()()) ( G GY Y F F = .   7 
  The Pykhtin (2003) model in a sense unifies the two models. In a generalized form let 
1 Y  be the driver of default as above, on the other hand let  
(4)  21112 1(1 ) Y X rrwzwz +-- =+  
be the driver of loss given default incorporating not only the systemic factor and a new 
idiosyncratic factor but also the idiosyncratic factor from  1 Y . The loss function  12 (,,) LXzz  is 
expressed by (3) as in the Frye’s model. The approach enables us to model the fact that loss in 
case of obligors’ default is determined by the value of assets and the specific financial 
situation at the time of default as well as by the workout/bankruptcy specific development. 
  Since we are in particular interested in unexpected loss given default modeling let us 
compare the three models in this respect. The unexpected loss given (hard) default conditional 































- = F = . On the other for the Frye model we get a nicer formula 





>=== - = + ￿  
since the value of  2 () GY does not depend on the idiosyncratic factor driving the default 
conditional on  Xx = . Regarding the Pykhtin model the reader may write down the double 
integral for  [|0,] ELLXx >= as an exercise. The approach if properly calibrated presents 
economically more faithful model compared to the other two. In fact the three correlation 
parameters of the model may be linked to the default correlation, loss given default 
correlation, and the default – loss given default correlation.  Nevertheless since the model is 
difficult to calibrate and as is computationally complex we will on the Tasche and Frye 
models. In fact the models are two special cases of the Pykhtin model: set in (4)  1 w = and 
12 rr = for the Tasche model and  0 w =  for the Frye model. 
  It follows from the analysis done in the following Section (see e.g. Figure 3) that the 
density function in (5) concentrates significantly to the border of default. Consequently given 
a correlation  12 rrr = = it is not surprising that the variance of  [|0,] ELLX > in the Tasche 
model given by (5) is much lower than the variance in the Frye’s model given by (6). To 
model losses in case of default we will use the beta distribution with minimum 0 and 
maximum 1 determined by its mean  m and standard deviation s .  Figure 2 shows the   8 
distributions of the portfolio LGD in the two models given that  0.4 m = ,  0.15 s = , and 
0.15 r = . In the Tasche model we used the probability of default  0.01 H p = . It is obvious that 
the variance of the portfolio LGD is much lower in the case of Tasche model than in the case 
of Frye model. In fact the standard deviation of the former is approximately 4.5% while the 


















































































Figure 2. Portfolio loss distribution in the Tasche and generalized Frye model ( 0.4 m = , 
0.15 s = ,  0.15 r = , 0.01 H p = ) 
 
  The Tasche model in spite of its appealing simplicity turns out to be inappropriate if 
unexpected loss is to be factorized according to (2). If the correlation is calibrated for the 
unexpected default rate calculation (i.e. around the regulatory values) then the portfolio LGD 
variance is too low compared to empirical observation. This follows for example from the 
study of Frye (2003) showing that LGD in bad years is almost twice the LGD in good years, 
or Frye (2000b) where the Frye model correlation coefficients  1 r and  2 r  calibrated to a 
Moody’s database appear to be almost equal. Another disadvantage of the Tasche model is 
that PD estimations cannot be separated from LGD estimations. On the other hand the Frye 
model can be calibrated separately according to volatility of frequencies of default over a 
number years and according to volatility of portfolio LGD observed in a time series. 
 
4. An Analysis of the Sensitivity of the Regulatory Capital Formula  
 
The phenomenon described in Section 2 has been partially explained in Witzany (2008) 
using a Merton model based simulation where we argued that a softer definition of default 
terminates the asset value stochastic process sooner than a hard definition of default, thus 
reducing the variance of losses determined by the average LGD set at the time of default.    9 
To provide a better analytical explanation of the difference between the real loss quantile 
and the regulatory loss quantile estimation (and its dependence on the definition of default) 
we will use the Frye and Tasche one factor models as benchmarks against which we compare 
the regulatory unexpected loss estimation.  In both the unexpected loss we need to estimate is 
given by 
(7)  [| ] ULELXx ==  
where 
1
( ) x a
- = F  and a is the regulatory probability level 0.999. 
Let us consider the Tasche model first. Let [0][] HH pPLPD =>=  be the probability of 
“hard default” ( 0 H DL ￿> ). Note that  (0)1 LH Fp =-  where  L F  is the distribution function 
of L. Consequently 
*( 0 ( ) ) () L LLYF Y = F = =  for 
1(1) H Yp
- £F -  and 
*( ())0 L LF Y F> =  for 
1(1) H Yp
- > F - . Hence 
1(1 ) H H yp
- =- F  is the hard default critical point for the factorY . As 
already explained banks naturally use a softer definition of default. Let us assume that such a 
definition of default is represented by another critical point  H yy < . With this new definition 
of default DYy ￿>the loss (given default) may be zero with a positive probability, 
[0|][]0 H PLDPyY y ==<> £ . This new definition of default  D does not change anything 
on the unexpected loss  [| ] ULELXx ==  where the notion of default is irrelevant. On the 
other hand the regulatory estimation of unexpected loss turns out to be different for the two 







































> ￿  
coincides with the regulatory formula for the unexpected default rate. The difference between 
(8) and (7) lies in the second part of the formula (8), i.e. in  [|] ELYy > where the regulation 
in general requires an average loss given default in the sense of the discussion above while the 
“real” unexpected loss  (7) can be decomposed as 
[|][| · [|,] ] ELXxPYyXx ELXxYy ==>= => .  
It appears obvious that [|,][|] ELXxYyELYy =>>> , the full proof is unfortunately 
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Both densities  1() z f and  2() z f  are normalized over the interval [ ) , y +¥  hence to show that 




< ￿￿  
we need to analyze the relationship between the two densities. It follows from properties of 
the normal distribution density that (provided  0 x >  and 0 r > ) there is an  yy > % so that 




- = F , 
1
(0.999) x
- F = , and  0.1 r = . Provided  () Lz is an increasing function 









































  Figure 3. Density functions  1 f  and  2 f  
  
To show that the regulatory unexpected loss is less than the Frye model unexpected 
loss is in fact much easier. In this case we just need to prove that 
(12)  2 2 2 [()] )|] [ 1 ( E XXx GYEG rrz < +-=  
with the notation from Section 3. The left hand side simply equals to  () () ydy Gyf
-
¥
¥ ￿  while the 
right hand side can be after a substitution written as  1 ()() Gyydy f
-
¥
¥ ￿ where 








- ￿￿ ￿￿ - Łł
= . For  0 r > it can be verified that the function  1() () y y ff <  on an 
interval  0 ( ,) y -¥ and  1() () y y ff > on  0 ( ) , y +¥ , see Figure 4. Consequently again (12) holds 













































  Figure 4. Density functions f  and  1 f    12 
 
Next we want to show that the function 
()[|]] · [| reg ULyPYyXx ELYy =>= > defined according to (8) is an increasing function of 










need to show that the ratio between the unexpected loss  () reg ULy and the expected loss 
























is an increasing function of  y . Note that the equation (13) is identical for the Tasche and Frye 
model.  Unfortunately we cannot prove generally that the function  (,) hyr is increasing in 








> and so  1 ( ) , hyr < for large  y while clearly  1 ( ) , hyr >  for smaller values 
of 0 y > . However it can be shown using numerical approximations that the function is 
increasing over a range of admissible values for y and r .  Figure 5 shows the function (13) 
strongly increasing with the values 
1
(0.999) x





























Figure 5 The ratio between the unexpected loss  () reg ULy and the expected loss 
[] ELincreases with  y    13 
 
 
5. Improved Regulatory Formula 
 
  In Section 3 we gave a general definition of one (systemic) factor model.  
We have seen that if Dis a consistent notion of default then the loss may be decomposed to 
· ] ,] [ | | [ ULPD x X L x EDX == = . It is not in general obvious that the conditional default 
rate [|] PDXx =   as well as the conditional loss given default  [|,] ELDXx = are increasing 
functions of x. However it is a property of the aforementioned one-factor models (Tasche, 
Frye, Pykhtin). Consequently it is correct in the context of one-factor models where both the 
conditional PD and conditional LGD are increasing functions of the systemic factor  X  to 
state that  
(14)  · ULUDRULGD =   
where  [|] UDRPDXx ==  is the a - quantile of possible default rates and 
[|,] ULGDELDXx ==  the a - quantile of possible LGDs with  x being the a - quantile of 
X . The unexpected default rate is estimated consistently by the reasonably well by the 
regulatory formula (1). But we improve it significantly requiring that LGD is not the expected 
loss given default but the unexpected portfolio level loss given default (ULGD) on the 99.9% 
probability level. 
  For practical applications we propose to use instead of the generalized Frye’s model. 
In the notation of Section 3 we just need to evaluate 





=>== - = + = ￿  
To complete our model we need to propose an appropriate loss given default functionG . We 
may follow Witzany (2008) specifying that  () GY  has a beta distribution calibrated to 
empirical mean and standard deviation. However since we consider that the default definition 
may be in a practice a softer one with a non-negligible percentage  cure p of receivables marked 
as defaulted being cured, i.e. ultimately ends up with zero loss, we extent the model as 
follows. Let m and s be the mean and standard deviation of observed positive losses assumed 
to have a beta distribution with minimum 0 and maximum 1. Let  ) ( , , Btms be the 
corresponding cumulative Beta distribution function on [0,1] then the mixed distribution 
function incorporating the possibility of cures is defined by    14 
(16)  · (,, ()(1) ) curecure Ftpp Btms =+- .  
Finally setting 
*
()(()) GYFY F =  we see that G has the distribution given byF . To estimate 
the 99.9% ULGD we just need to evaluate (15) numerically for 
1
(0.999) x
- F = . Figure 6 
illustrates the account-level LGD density function given by F for a given set of parameters 
(with mass weight  cure p  at 0) and the transformed portfolio level LGD density function of 






















































































Figure 6. Account and transformed portfolio loss given default distribution ( 0.3 cure p = , 
0.4 m = ,  0.15 s = ,  0.1 r = ). 
 
Unexpected loss estimated using the described technique is however still sensitive to the 
definition of default although Figure 8 shows that the sensitivity is moderate and opposite 
compared to the regulatory capital (unexpected loss estimation increases with softer definition 
of default). Another applicable solution is then to adjust the probability of (conventional soft) 
default  p  with the observed probability of cures  cure p and then apply the hard default based 
formula  
(17)  ((1))· (,) cure ULGD ULUDRpp ms =-  
where unexpected loss given (hard default) is estimated according to (15) using the beta 
distribution with mean m and standard deviation s .  
 
6. Numerical Examples 
 
  We are going to compare the values of regulatory unexpected loss in different 
scenarios: unexpected loss in the Tasche model, and unexpected loss in the Frye model with 
and without the cure rate. The scenarios are specified by the probability of hard default  H p , 
loss given (hard) default mean m and standard deviation s , correlations  1 rr =  and  2 r , and   15 
the cure rate  cure p . The probability of soft default is then recalculated as  /(1) SHcure ppp =- , 
the loss given soft default mean as  (1) ur S ce p mm - = and the standard deviation 
22
(1)() S curecure pp s s m -+ = .  
  Figure 7 shows how it is difficult to align the Tasche and Frye model. If we fix 
15% r = as the correlation related to unexpected default rate and the other parameters as 
specified below than in order to obtain the same unexpected loss in the Frye model as in the 
Tasche model the LGD correlation must be reduced down to 1% or even less. Such a 
calibration is n contradiction with empirical studies like Frye (2000b, 2003). Thus we focus 


































  Figure 7. Comparison of the 99,9% unexpected loss in the Tasche model and Frye 
model depending on  2 r (with 1% H p = ,  45% m = , 15% s = ,  15% r = ,  0% cure p = ) 
 
Figure 8 on compares the regulatory unexpected loss estimate with different estimation 
approaches based on the Frye model explained at the end of the previous section. While the 
UL_reg curve shows the regulatory unexpected loss declining with the cure rate going up, the 
curve UL_Frye_S based on the beta distribution calibrated to  S m and  S s turns out to be 
increasing. The dependence is weaker if we use the mixed beta distribution (16) 
(UL_Frye_S_c) and logically it is fully eliminated (UL_Frye_H) when we use (17). We 
consider the positive sensitivity of UL_Frye_S_c on the cure rate motivating banks to use a 
harder definition of default to be much more acceptable than the negative sensitivity of 
UL_reg which motivates banks to use a softer definition of default that is not usually ideal for 
credit risk modelling as pointed out in Witzany (2008). The problem is fully solved by   16 
recalculating the probability of soft default to the probability of hard default, which might be 








































Figure 8. Regulatory and Frye model based 99,9% unexpected loss estimations 
depending on  cure p  (with 2.5% H p = ,  70% m = , 15% s = ,  1 15% rr == , 2 8% r = ) 
   
Incorporation of unexpected loss given default into unexpected loss calculation 
significantly increases the value compared to the regulatory unexpected loss. If we wanted to 
setup the model in line with current regulatory capital values we could consider reducing of 
the (artificially high) regulatory level. It turns out that the level of 99.5% (proposed e.g. for 
the Solvency II ) leads to comparable values of the regulatory UL on the 99.9% level and the 
Frye model UL on the 99.5% level. The relationship nevertheless depends on the s and 
2 r values. Figure 9 finally compares the sensitivity the 99.9% regulatory UL and 99.5% Frye 
model UL (17) on the probability of default and expected loss given default, other parameters 
fixed. The 99.5% Frye UL turns out to be more sensitive than the regulatory UL with respect 
to the probability of default but less to the expected loss given default. Hence by an 
appropriate recalibration of the confidence level we do not obtain the same unexpected loss 
estimations in all scenarios but using the proposed model we obtain a better correspondence 
between the real risk and the economic capital, more robust calculations, and at the same time 
overall same average level of capital. 
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Figure 9. Sensitivity of the 99.9% regulatory and 99.5% Frye model unexpected loss on  H p  





We have demonstrated and analytically explained that the regulatory capital according to 
the Basle II formula is sensitive to the definition of default. We have shown that the problem 
may be relatively simply solved in the context of general single factor models requiring that 
the LGD parameter is reinterpreted as the 99.9% percentile of possible losses given default. 
We have considered three particular one (systemic) factor models and concluded that the one 
with two idiosyncratic factors proposed by Frye is the most appropriate to implement 
practically our model. The best results are provided by the model where the observed 
probability of soft default is adjusted using the cure rate to obtain the probability of hard 
default (which can be fully determined only ex post). Since the extended model gives higher 
unexpected loss values the confidence level can be recalibrated to a lower value (e.g. 99.5%) 
to achieve comparable capital levels. The resulting formula, which could replace the 
regulatory formula, provides a more robust and economically more faithful estimates of 
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